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NOTE
Voter Standing: A New Means for Third
Parties to Challenge the Tax-Exempt
Status of Nonprofit Organizations?
Introduction
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prohibits tax-exempt organiza-
tions from engaging in lobbying activities.1 "The IRS has been known to
wink at this absolute proscription, especially when it sees a violation by
an established religious body."2 Certain pro-abortion rights groups felt
that the IRS was tolerating lobbying by the Catholic Church, the groups'
leading adversary, while denying pro-abortion lobbying. The groups, a
consortium of twenty-nine individuals and organizations (referred to col-
lectively as Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. (ARM)), brought suit
against the IRS and the two principal national organizations of the Cath-
olic Church, the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) and the Na-
tional Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB).3
In the first of a series of cases known collectively as ARM,4 the pro-
abortion plaintiffs contended that the IRS had erroneously and illegally
granted tax-exempt status to the Catholic Church because the church is
actively engaged in its nationwide "Pastoral Plan" to outlaw abortion
1. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1988). Substantially unchanged from the 1976 version,
§ 501(c)(3) allows an organization tax-exempt status as long as "no substantial part of the
[organization's] activities ... is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation ... and [the organization] does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office." See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
2. Schwarz & Hutton, Recent Developments in Tax-Exempt Organizations, 18 U.S.F. L.
REV. 649, 668 (1984); see also Evans, Challenge to IRS Enforcement of Ban on PoliticalActivi-
ties by Churches Poses Difficult Questions for High Court, 38 TAx NoTES 1194, 1196 (1987).
3. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
4. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(ARM 1); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(ARM I1); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(ARM 111); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(ARM IF); In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987) (ARM T);
United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268
(1988) (ARM VJ).
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through lobbying and participation in political campaigns.5 The plaintiffs
asserted that the IRS had not permitted tax-exempt organizations with
opposing views on the abortion controversy to lobby or otherwise influ-
ence the political process. 6 The defendants answered by challenging the
plaintiffs' standing to sue since the plaintiffs represented a third party;
that is, the plaintiffs' tax-exemption was not in question.' The district
court found voter standing, stating, "[P]laintiffs have alleged government
action which has improperly biased the political process against the dis-
crete group to which they belong."8 The Second Circuit rejected a chal-
lenge to the district court's determination of plaintiffs' standing, but did
so on a procedural ground.9
This procedural aspect of the case was argued before the Supreme
Court along with the underlying issue of "whether ARM has standing to
sue the IRS to compel it to revoke the church's exempt status."10 The
Supreme Court addressed the procedural issue but remanded the issue of
standing with no guidelines regarding the legitimacy of voter standing in
this context.'I
This Note examines the policy, procedure, and enforcement of tax-
exemption for nonprofit, charitable organizations and analyzes the ARM
cases with regard to both the doctrine of standing in third-party suits and
the legislative policy favoring nonprofit, charitable organizations. Part I
sets forth the legislative provisions for tax-exemption of charitable orga-
nizations, the Court's interpretation of those provisions, and the proce-
dure for an organization to attain, and retain, exemption status. Part II
,discusses the concept of standing as it applies to third parties challenging
the tax-exempt status of an organization. Part III discusses the voter-
standing strategy used in the ARM cases and the disposition of the stand-
ing issue in the district court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court. Fi-
nally, Part IV assesses ARM in light of the purposes of federal tax-
exempt status to conclude that the Supreme Court should ultimately re-
ject voter standing as a new avenue for third parties to challenge the tax-
exempt status of nonprofit, charitable organizations.
5. ARM I, 544 F. Supp. at 475.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 476.
8. Id. at 481.
9. ARM V, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987) (the matter on appeal involved whether nonparty
witnesses, USCC and NCCB (who were dismissed as defendants in ARM 1) had standing on
appeal to challenge a district court's subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit in which the
witnesses had been compelled to furnish evidence).
10. Payne, Supreme Court Hears Argument in Catholic Church Lobbying Case, 39 TAx
NOTES 436, 436 (1988).
11. ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988).
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I. Tax-exempt Status
Congress has provided a significant benefit to certain nonprofit orga-
nizations through two key provisions in the Internal Revenue Code. Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) states that certain charitable organizations that provide
beneficial services to the public are eligible to be exempt from taxation. 12
Section 170(c)(2) allows taxpayers who contribute to these organizations
to enjoy a tax deduction for their donations. 13 The Supreme Court has
recognized that "[b]oth tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form
of subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption
has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization. ... .""
These tax benefits are allowed because the legislature recognizes that
charitable organizations perform many of the same public services as
governmental institutions.' 5 The Supreme Court has found that "in en-
acting both section 170 [allowing deductibility] and section 501(c)(3)
[tax-exemption], Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable or-
ganizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that
serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public
institutions of the same kind."16 Such economic benefits provide strong
12. Organizations are exempt from the payment of income taxes if they meet certain crite-
ria set forth in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 1988). In pertinent part, that section applies to:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op-
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, liter-
ary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facili-
ties or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals ....
Id.
13. Under I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 1988), charitable contributions are deductible if they are
to or for the use of:
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or
under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any pos-
session of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, liter-
ary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facili-
ties or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals ....
Id.
14. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983); see
alsoARMI, 544 F. Supp. 471,475 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (tax-exempt organizations receive a double
benefit from § 501(c)(3) exemption and tax-deductible contributions).
15. A Congressional report summarized the purpose of tax-exemption:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other
purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss
of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met
by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promo-
tion of the general welfare.
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 742 (1939).
16. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States (Bob Jones I), 461 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1983). Tax-
exemption has been allowed for organizations that provide charitable, religious, educational,
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incentives to nonprofit organizations both to attain and retain tax-exempt
status and thus to receive tax-exempt, tax-deductible contributions.
To achieve section 501(c)(3) exemption status, an organization must
first request a letter of determination from the IRS. 7 If the IRS makes a
favorable determination, the determination is effective "as of the date the
organization was formed if [the organization's] activities were consistent
with exemption."'" The IRS will specify the effective date if the organiza-
tion must modify its activities in order to qualify. 9
Once an organization attains status under sections 501(c)(3) and
170(c)(2) it is subject to review by the IRS on an annual basis. Each year
the IRS determines if an organization's exemption status will remain un-
changed, require modification, or be revoked. Recourse from a revoca-
tion determination is restrictive; an organization must first exhaust
administrative appeal procedures before turning to the courts. 20 The non-
profit organization must receive notice,2' an indication of whether the
revocation is prospective or retroactive, 22 and district office review. 23
labor, agricultural, public utilities, scientific, social welfare, and other services. See generally
P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAX-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 4 (1979).
17. Organizations desiring tax-exempt status apply to the IRS key district office adminis-
tering the location of the organization's principal place of business. Rev. Proc. 84-46, 1984-1
C.B. 541. The district offices review applications but they refer to the National Office on ques-
tions not covered by published precedent. Id. The National Office reviews each key district
determination to assure uniformity in the application of rulings and precedents before a letter
is issued to the applying organization. M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1981
& 1988 Cum. Supp. No. 1), 3.04[3][g].
18. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 17, at 3.04[3][g].
19. Id.
20. In 1974, the Supreme Court held in two cases that courts could not restrain the IRS
from revoking either an organization's § 501(c)(3) exempt status, or its qualification for tax-
deductible contributions. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon (Bob Jones 1), 416 U.S. 725 (1974) and
Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974). An affected organization could
only obtain judicial review in a tax-deficiency proceeding or a suit for a refund. In response,
Congress passed I.R.C. § 7428, which provides a declaratory judgment procedure (limited to
the organization whose qualifications or status is at issue) that allows judicial review of both
the initial determination and each annual redetermination of the exemption status of a non-
profit organization. The statute requires that the organization pursue its claim through the
regular administrative procedures before judicial review is available. M. SALTZMAN, supra
note 17, at 3.04[3][g][ii].
21. Acceptable methods of notice are listed in Rev. Proc. 84-46, which requires that revo-
cation or modification of a ruling or determination letter may be made by (1) a notice to the
taxpayer to whom the ruling or determination letter originally was issued, (2) enactment of
legislation or ratification of a tax treaty, (3) a Supreme Court decision, (4) issuance of tempo-
rary or final regulations, or (5) issuance of a revenue ruling revenue procedure, or other state-
ment published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Rev. Proc. 84-46, 1984-1 C.B. 541.
22. Rev. Proc. 80-25 provides that revocation ordinarily will take effect no later than the
time at which the organization received written notice that its exemption ruling or determina-
tion letter might be revoked or modified. But revocation may be retroactive if the organization
(a) omitted or misstated a material fact, (b) operated in a manner materially different from that
originally represented, or (c) engaged in a prohibited transaction for the purpose of diverting
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Tax-exempt status comes with specified limitations, including a pro-
hibition against lobbying and related political activities. A section
501(c)(3) nonprofit, charitable organization is prohibited from "par-
ticipat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in (including the publishing or distribut-
ing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office."'2 4 Justice Rehnquist summarized the Court's position on
the matter by writing, "In short, Congress chose not to subsidize lobby-
ing as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activities that nonprofit
organizations undertake to promote the public welfare."25
If an organization has its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status re-
voked because it has violated the limitations, the organization has both
administrative and judicial recourse." Neither of these procedures pro-
vides for suits by third parties wishing to challenge an organization's ex-
empt status.2 7 Before a third party can mount such a challenge, it must
demonstrate an independent right to bring a suit under the doctrine of
standing.
II. Doctrine of Standing
The concept of standing arose from the requirement that federal
corpus or income from its exempt purpose involving a substantial part if its corpus or income.
Rev. Proc. 80-25, 1980-1 C.B. 667.
23. Rev. Proc. 84-46, 1984-1 C.B. 541 (provides guidelines for review).
24. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2) (West 1988). The IRS has revoked tax-exempt sta-
tus. One high profile organization, The Sierra Club, lost its tax-exemption in 1966 because the
club used its tax-deductible donations to advance its views through the political system (sup-
porting a state park referendum and legislation creating national parks, active involvement in
influencing state and national legislative proposals, and employment of a lobbyist in Washing-
ton, D.C.). R. HOLBERT, TAX LAW AND POLITICAL ACCESS: THE BIAS OF PLURALISM RE-
VISITED 38-39 (American Politics Series No. 04-023, vol. 2, 1975); see also B. HOPKINS, THE
LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 14.2 (5th ed. 1987) (lists other disqualifying activi-
ties).
The lobbying limitation was repeatedly attacked as an infringement on the first amend-
ment rights of § 501(c)(3) organizations until the Supreme Court decided Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Section 501(c)(3) does not violate
the First Amendment but disallows subsidization of First Amendment activity with public
funds).
25. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
Additionally, a § 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization "may create section 501(c)(4) affiliates
to carry out their lobbying, and the two entities may co-exist and even share offices, directors,
office space and common goals without loss of exemption. The only restriction is that tax-
deductible contributions may not find their way into the lobbying affiliate's bank account."
Schwarz & Hutton, supra note 2, at 666; see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 543-44.
26. See supra note 20.
27. I.R.C. § 7428 does not provide a cause of action, express or implied, to third parties
who wish to challenge the IRS determination of an exempt nonprofit organization. See supra
note 20.
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courts only have constitutional power to decide cases or controversies.28
The Supreme Court has stated that the "standing inquiry must be an-
swered by reference to the Art[icle] III notion that federal courts may
exercise power only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity.' "29 Addition-
ally, Article III standing can be attained "only when adjudication is 'con-
sistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute is one]
traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process.' "30
An inquiry into standing is therefore a determination of whether the
plaintiff is in a position to bring his case or controversy before the
court.3 1 As one commentator has expressed, "The doctrine of standing
simply defines who has the power to trigger the process of judicial re-
view-who, in other words, may act individually or, at times, for the
community."32
In Flast v. Cohen,33 Chief Justice Warren wrote, "[The words 'cases'
and 'controversies'] in part ... define the role assigned to the judiciary in
a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 34
28. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-[between a State and Citizens of another State; -]*between
Citizens of different States;-between citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONSm. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. *Changed by the Eleventh Amendment.
29. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
30. Id. at 752 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)); see also Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472-73 (1982).
31. Standing doctrine "reflects the general proposition that a citizen not directly subject to
regulation may under some circumstances go to court to challenge government action or inac-
tion." Stephan, Nontaxpayer Litigation of Income Tax Disputes, 73 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 73
(1984).
32. Dow, Standing and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1196 (1987).
33. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
34. Id. at 94-95. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974), the Court denied standing to plaintiffs in their capacity as United States citizens in a
suit under Article I, § 6, challenging the ineligibility of a reservist from holding office "since
'every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve the interests of all,' recognition of
'citizen' standing 'has no boundaries' and would therefore 'distort the role of the Judiciary in
its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable
charge of providing government by injunction.'" Id. at 226-27. In United States v. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), decided the same day, the Court addressed the fact that in some
controversies no private party would have standing: "[T]he absence of any particular individ-
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The Burger Court refined the standing doctrine in Allen v. Wright 5 by
stating that it is "built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers,"'3 6 reemphasizing "'the proper-and properly limited-role of
the courts in a democratic society.' 37
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.
noted "that the concept of 'Art[icle] III standing' has not been defined
with complete consistency.",38 But he wrote, "[O]f one thing we may be
sure: Those who do not possess Art[icle] III standing may not litigate as
suitors in the courts of the United States"; 39 their claims may be more
appropriately redressed by the executive or legislative branches.'
A. Requirements of Standing
To ascertain whether a plaintiff has constitutional standing, the
threshold question is whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an other-
wise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that contro-
versy." ' The focus is "on the party seeking to get his complaint before a
federal court" rather than "on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated."42
The Supreme Court has outlined the requirements for attaining Ar-
ticle III standing. First, "[The plaintiff] personally [must have] suffered .
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal con-
ual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is
committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process." Id. at 179.
The trend toward separation of powers as the basis for denying standing led one commen-
tator to observe, "[T]he bizarre consequence of recent standing decisions is that they tell in-
jured plaintiffs to turn to the very political process about which they are attempting to
complain." Dow, supra note 32, at 1213.
35. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
36. Id. at 752.
37. Id. at 752, 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). See generally
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SuF-
FOLK U.L. REv. 881 (1983).
38.. 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). In his treatise on constitutional law, Laurence H. Tribe
asserted that "unless the Court modifies or attempts to clarify its approach, standing doctrine
will likely remain a mystery to litigants and lower courts." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 111 (2d ed. 1988); see also Note, "More Than an Intuition, Less Than
a Theory". Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L. Rav. 564, 569 (1986)
("From these few, cryptic words are derived several of the most arcane, complex, and unset-
tled doctrines in American constitutional law.").
39. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475-76.
40. Id. at 473-75.
41. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) ("[plaintiff must] 'allege-I
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of fed-
eral-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.").
42. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
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duct of the defendant" 43 (injury in fact). Second (a two-prong test), the
injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action,"'  (causation) and
the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" 45 (redres-
sability). Once the plaintiff satisfies these requirements, he "may still lack
standing under ...prudential principles.",16 The Court considers the
consequences of granting standing in the individual case according to
two general guidelines: avoiding decisions on broad social questions
"where no individual rights would be vindicated"'47 and limiting federal
court access "to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."48
1. Injury in fact: Is the injury too abstract?9
In order to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, "a litigant must
... demonstrate, regardless of the actual existence of a claimed injury or
its subjective importance, an individuated harm impacting specifically
upon him and of a tangible, concrete nature."5°
Guidelines provided by the Court as to what constitutes an injury
are vague: an injury must be "distinct and palpable"'" and cannot be
"abstract," "conjectural," or "hypothetical."52  The Court cautioned
that "these terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the con-
stitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise"5 3 and pointed to
the extensive case law for guidance.
An injury, though not flowing from the terms of the law, may none-
theless occur as a result of the law's application. For example, the Court
has held as injuries in fact the following: an employee's loss of employ-
ment as the result of a law that directly affected only his employer,
5 4
plaintiffs' suffering adverse changes in economic relationships because of
43. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
44. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976); see also
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
45. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38;'see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
46. Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. at 99-100.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
50. L. TRIBE, supra note 38, at § 3-16 at 114; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975).
51. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S.
at 100.
52. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citihg City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)
and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
53. Allen, 468 U.S, at 751.
54. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (challenge of an equal protection clause
in an Arizona statute that placed a ceiling on the percentage of aliens allowed in a work force
allowed by a soon-to-be-discharged alien employee).
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the effect a law had on their economic livelihood,5" and interference by
operation of a law on a business' prospective business activities. 6
Although the plaintiff must allege a tangible, concrete injury, that
injury can be prospective in nature. The Court has held allegations of
future injuries sufficient to grant standing. In allowing a suit by nursing
home residents to prevent their involuntary transfer to other nursing
home facilities, the Court found a concrete though prospective injury and
stated, "One does not have to await the consummation of threatened in-
jury to obtain preventative relief."57
2. Causation/Redressability
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the second requirement for
Article III standing is a two-prong inquiry: first, a determination that
the injury was caused by the challenged governmental action and second,
that the remedy sought will redress the problem. 8
a. Causation: Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and
injury too attenuated?59
Injury in fact must be coupled with the requirement that there is a
direct causal relationship between the injury by the challenged govern-
mental action or operation of law.6" The Court has noted that "to meet
the minimum requirement of Art[icle] III[, the plaintiff must] establish
55. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, Inc., 397 U.S. 150
(1970) (adverse impact to existing data processors' economic interests because of the prospect
of competition with regulated national banks created the personal stake required to challenge
the validity of agency rulings that allowed the competition); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 (1970) (suit by tenant farmers challenging federal expansion of landlord lease pow-
ers); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (interference with private utility
monopoly through government subsidy of TVA).
56. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (liquor wholesalers chal-
lenged a tax that raised prices only on import liquor sold to retailers); Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (challenge of statute imposing
fundraising limits that could be waived only in circumstances where raising contributions was
effectively prevented); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (challenge of federal water supply
restriction to land exceeding 160 acres under single ownership).
57. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000 (1982) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)).
The possibility of criminal prosecution may also satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement; see
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (union challenged regu-
lations limiting labor representation in elections, consumer publicity, and boycotts). But see
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing disallowed in injunction on police
use of chokeholds by a chokehold victim because he could not prove he would ever be subject
to a chokehold again).
58. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-59 (1984); see also Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).(both causation and redressability required to attain
Article III standing; Congress cannot confer standing by statute).
59. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
60. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505-07 (1975); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
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that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants'
actions . "..."61 The causation element for standing is the traditional tort
law requirement. The court must find that the injury the plaintiff seeks to
litigate would not have occurred but for the defendant's action. The
plaintiffs will not satisfy this element if they rely "on little more than the
remote possibility, unsubstantiated by allegations of fact, that their situa-
tion might have been better had [the defendants] acted otherwise, and
might improve were the court to afford relief."" E
b. Redressability: Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a
result of a favorable ruling too speculative?63
To meet the second prong, it is essential that the plaintiff show "an
injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.""
Standing will fail if the remedy sought will not redress the plaintiff's
injury.
3. Prudential Limitations
The first two requirements, injury in fact and causation/
redressability, are the constitutional requirements of Article III standing.
The Supreme Court has imposed additional limitations on standing for
prudent administration of the judiciary.65 These prudential restraints are
designed to prevent standing when no specific individual's rights would
be vindicated66 and to limit federal court access to those plaintiffs who
are "best suited to assert a particular claim.",67 The Court has termed
such prudential limitations nonconstitutional.68
First, if a plaintiff presents "'abstract questions of wide public sig-
nificance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared
and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches[,]" 69 a
court will deny standing. Even after proving that the plaintiff himself has
suffered an injury in fact, if "the harm asserted amounts only to a genera-
lized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially
equal measure[,]" 70 the plaintiff will not attain standing for failure to
61. Warth, 422 U.S. at 505.
62. Id. at 507.
63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
64. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
65. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 ("Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction ....").
66. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
67. Id. at 100.
68. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51; see also Dow, supra note 32, at 1198.
69. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975));
see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
70. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
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overcome this prudential limitation.
Second, where a particular statute or constitutional provision is at
issue, a court will deny standing if the plaintiff does not present a claim
falling "within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
[law] or constitutional guarantee .. ". . " In performing this zone-of-
interests inquiry, the court investigates legislative purpose to determine
whether the plaintiff has a recognized right of action.72 The Supreme
Court has found "[t]he essential inquiry [to be] whether Congress 'in-
tended for [a particular] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to challenge
agency disregard of the law.' ,3 In assessing whether the plaintiff is as-
serting a right within a protected zone of interest, the Court often asks
whether Congress contemplated the action at issue when drafting the
law. The Court has concluded that "the test denies a right of review if the
plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit."74
Third, standing may be denied if a plaintiff rests his claim "on the
legal rights or interests of third parties."75 This limitation is designed
narrowly to define circumstances in which one party will have standing
to assert the legal rights of another. The Supreme Court has held that
"even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the 'case or
controversy' requirement,.., the plaintiff generally must assert his own
legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties.' "76 The Court considered this a desir-
able limitation when the rights of third parties are implicated in order to
avoid "the adjudication of rights which those not before the Court may
not wish to assert, and [to] assur[e] that the most effective advocate of the
rights at issue is present to champion them."77
B. Third-Party Standing
Although the Court will deny standing to a plaintiff asserting the
rights of another when that person is better situated to sue, the court may
find standing when the plaintiff is a third party to the defendant's actions
or the operation of law. In determining whether a plaintiff can attain
71. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, Inc., 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
72. Stephan, supra note 31, at 83.
73. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (quoting Block v. Community
Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347 (1984) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970))).
74. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399.
75. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)); see
also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
76. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (quoting
Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
77. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80.
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standing to assert the rights of third parties (jus tertii standing),78 the
Court weighs several factors. First, the Court determines the likelihood
that the rights of the third party will be impaired if the plaintiff is not
allowed to assert those rights. Second, the Court evaluates the impor-
tance of the relationship between the plaintiff and the third party and
whether vindication of the third party's rights will remove the injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff. Finally, if the plaintiff's interest is closely analogous
to the third party's interests so that the plaintiff is an effective proponent
of the latter's rights, the Court will grant standing.79
1. Taxpayer Standing
Though the Court generally has been lenient in granting personal
standing, the reverse is true in both taxpayer standing and federal income
tax cases brought by third parties. One commentator has observed that
"[i]ndeterminancy in the application of doctrine does not obscure one
indisputable feature of the standing cases: outside the tax area, the Court
has shown substantial, albeit intermittent, leniency in granting standing,
but in tax cases the Court has never found an acceptable occasion for
private enforcement."80 A taxpayer has standing to challenge laws re-
garding his own taxation,8" and may, in that capacity, have sufficient
interest to challenge governmental spending on the theory that his own
taxes might be reduced if the challenged spending were curtailed.82
Although a taxpayer might challenge his own taxation, the Court
has made third-party standing, in which a plaintiff challenges another
party's tax status, essentially unattainable. A line of Supreme Court deci-
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (5th ed. 1979); see generally Monaghan, Third Party
Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984); Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Terti" A
Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308 (1982).
79. See generally Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 38, at § 3-
19; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.12(f)(3), at 81 (3d ed.
1986).
80. Stephan, supra note 31, at 83. Despite federal restrictions, many states allow taxpayer
standing in challenges of state and local tax expenditures. See Comment, Taxpayers' Suits:
Standing Barriers and Pecuniary Restraints, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 951, 962 (1986).
81. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 267 (1984) (liquor wholesaler
taxpayer had standing to challenge excise tax on wholesale liquor sales).
82. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer allowed to challenge under the Establish-
ment Clause a federal aid-to-education program that allocated a portion of the aid to parochial
schools); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (taxpayers granted standing to challenge a
federal program of payment to farmers to reduce acreage allotments).
In Flast, the Court developed a two-part nexus test whereby a taxpayer may challenge the
constitutionality of a federal tax or expenditure only if a logical nexus exists between the status
of the taxpayer and the claim. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03. The Supreme Court has not allowed
any plaintiff to meet the stringent requirements of the test since Flast for fear of the extensive
litigation that could result if every federal taxpayer were allowed to challenge every federal
government taxing and spending program. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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sions8" makes it "almost impossible for third parties to meet the jurisdic-
tional prerequisite of standing to sue."84 In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 8 the plaintiffs (indigents who had been refused ser-
vice at private hospitals) sought reversal of a revenue ruling that had
conferred charitable status only to hospitals that offered free emergency
room service (not free full service).86 The Court ruled that the plaintiffs
lacked standing, individually or as a class, to attack the institutions' tax
exemptions. 8
7
In rejecting the plaintiffs' bid for standing, the Court found both the
injury-in-fact and causation elements unsatisfied. The Court held that it
was "purely speculative whether the denials of service" to the plaintiffs
were caused by the revenue ruling.8" Additionally, the causal link be-
tween the tax exemption and denial of service to indigents was too tenu-
ous and whatever injuries the plaintiffs had suffered were not fairly
traceable to the government's allegedly flawed ruling.89 "Moreover, the
complaint suggests no substantial likelihood that victory in this suit
would result in respondents' receiving the hospital treatement they de-
sire."9 Because the plaintiffs failed to meet the Article III case or con-
troversy requirements, the Court denied standing.9 Justice Stewart,
concurring in Eastern Kentucky, wrote that he could not "now imagine a
case ... where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever
could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else."
92
2. Voter Standing
Voter standing is not third-party standing per se. It is a theory that
third parties can use to gain standing. A plaintiff may assert voter stand-
ing when government action or inaction has affected his ability to partici-
pate effectively in the political process. Although the plaintiff is in the
position of a third party because the challenged action governs another
group, he asserts a first-person injury because the resulting benefit to that
group has affected him directly.93
83. See, eg., Allen V. Wright 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Simon V. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
84. Schwarz, Recent Developments in Tax-Exempt Organizations, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 299,
325 (1985); see also Stephan, supra note 31, at 73 (doctrine of standing has barred third-party
suits in federal income tax suits).
85. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 42.
89. Id. at 42-45.
90. Id. at 45-46.
91. Id. Since the constitutional elements of the doctrine of standing were not met, the
Court did not evaluate the prudential limitations.
92. Id. at 46.
93. See generally Monaghan, supra note 78; Sedler, supra note 78.
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In Baker v. Carr,94 the seminal case for voter standing, a group of
Tennessee citizens challenged a state apportionment scheme because it
"effect[ed] a gross disproportion of representation to voting population"
that impaired the effectiveness of their votes by "placing them in a posi-
tion of unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis" voters in other counties.95 The
plaintiffs sued " 'on their own behalf and on behalf of all qualified voters
of their respective counties, and ... of the State of Tennessee who are
similarly situated .... 96
The standing inquiry turned on the first prong of the Article III
requirements, whether the plaintiffs "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely de-
pends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions[.]" 97 After de-
termining the first prong, the Court found "[i]t would not be necessary to
decide whether [the plaintiffs'] allegations of impairment of their votes by
the 1901 apportionment will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in
order to hold that they have standing to seek it."98
The plaintiffs were found to have standing because they asserted" 'a
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of
their votes,' 99 not merely a claim of 'the right, possessed by every citizen,
to require that the Government be administered according to law
.... "' In granting standing, the Court did not differentiate between
the plaintiffs' standing as individuals and as third parties on behalf of
others.101
III. Third-Party Standing Under the ARM Cases
"Some of the most politically sensitive tax cases in recent years have
been suits by third parties [some who have alleged voter standing] chal-
lenging the IRS's grant of tax-exempt status to organizations that alleg-
edly fail to meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3)."' 02 In the ARM
cases, 0 3 involving the volatile issue of abortion, the plaintiffs asserted
that lobbying and other political activities in favor of anti-abortion by the
94. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
95. Id. at 207.
96. Id. at 204-05 (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 204.
98. Id. at 208 (prudential limitations evolved in later cases).
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 206.
102. Schwarz, supra note 84, at 325 (referring to Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)
(racial discrimination), ARM I, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), and ARM 1I, 552 F. Supp.
364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)); see also Stephan, supra note 31, at 73 (adding Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
103. See supra note 4.
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Catholic Church violated section 501(c)(3). The plaintiffs' position as
taxpayers challenging another taxpayer's status seemed to make their
standing to sue unlikely, however, the ARM plaintiffs used a unique
strategy-voter standing, rather than taxpayer standing-to advance
their right to sue.
A. The ARM Facts
In 1980, ARM filed suit against the United States Government, the
United States Catholic Conference (USCC), and the National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) to revoke the tax-exempt status of the
Roman Catholic Church on the ground that the Church had violated the
anti-electioneering provision of Internal Revenue Code Section501(c)(3).104
The plaintiffs alleged that the Church, in accordance with its "Pas-
toral Plan," was "lobbying and participating in partisan political cam-
paigns on behalf of candidates supporting the Roman Catholic Church's
position on abortion and in opposition to candidates with contrary
views."10 5
Despite this activity, the IRS "annually since March 25, 1946, has
ruled that 'the agencies and instrumentalities and all educational, chari-
table and religious institutions operated, supervised, or controlled by or
in connection with the Roman Catholic Church in the United States...
are entitled to exemption from Federal income tax under .. section
501(c)(3) .... "6
ARM sued both the Government and the Catholic Church in order
to force the Church to forego either its political activities or its tax-ex-
empt status.10 7 The plaintiffs also asserted a concurrent refusal by the
IRS to extend tax-exempt status to those on the other side of this volatile
issue: "[N]o organization with views on the abortion controversy [differ-
ent from those of the Catholic Church] has been granted tax-exempt sta-
104. ARMI, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
105. ARM I, 544 F. Supp. at 475. The Pastoral Plan was promulgated by the NCCB in
1975 to organize the Catholic Church's pro-life activities. The plan outlines three major efforts,
one of which is a program to influence the legislative, judicial and administrative areas to
advance the Catholic Church's views on abortion. The program is strikingly similar in sub-
stance to that of The Sierra Club. See supra note 24. The plan has been implemented, and
pursuant to it the Church has engaged in lobbying and political activities. See McRae v.
Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 703-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (description of some of the Church's electoral and legislative
activities).
106. ARM 1, 544 F. Supp. at 475 (the church defendants submitted as an exhibit a letter
from T. Kern, District Director, (IRS to USCC, June 16, 1980), that stated, "USCC is the
recipient of the Revenue Ruling letter that certifies the church's exempt status.").
107. ARM 1, 544 F. Supp. at 475. The district court dismissed the complaint against the
church defendants in ARM L Id. at 473. Later, the court refused to certify its procedural
holdings for interlocutory review. ARM II, 552 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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tus under Section 501(c)(3) while being permitted to participate in
electoral politics. ' 10 8 As a result of this inequitable application of the
Internal Revenue Code, the plaintiffs alleged that they had "been denied
access to a means of contributing tax-deductible funds to promote free
choice candidates""0 9 while the Catholic Church can be used to "funnel
[tax-deductible] donations to support candidates opposed to abortion
"110
B. ARM Voter Standing Theory
In this private enforcement action, the plaintiffs sought to "step in
the shoes of the IRS" to revoke the church defendants' section 501(c)(3)
status and its qualification under section 170(c)(2) to receive tax-deducti-
ble donations, 1. 1 Knowing that it would be difficult to satisfy the nexus
requirement to attain taxpayer standing,1 12 the plaintiffs used the voter
standing theory to assert their rights as third parties.1 13 As voters, the
plaintiffs contended that the unequal treatment of the IRS regarding tax-
exemption directly affected their ability to obtain tax-deductible dona-
tions which in turn affected their political clout. 14 The voter standing
theory shifted the emphasis from the plaintiffs as third parties to the
plaintiffs directly injured by inequitable operation of the law.
To assess the plaintiffs' standing, the district court applied the doc-
trine of standing's three-part constitutional inquiry, then considered the
results in light of prudential limitations.
1. Constitutional Requirements
a. Injury in fact
The plaintiffs alleged that by allowing tax-exempt status for the
Catholic Church under sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2) despite the
church's political activities, while denying such status and political lati-
tude to the plaintiffs, the IRS has "distorted the electoral and legislative
process by creating a system in which members of the public have greater
incentive to donate funds to the Roman Catholic Church than to politi-
cally active abortion rights groups . .. ,"15 The plaintiffs had thus suf-
fered economic injury because "each dollar contributed to the church
108. ARM I, 544 F. Supp. at 475.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 476.
112. See supra note 82.
113. ARM I, 544 F. Supp. at 476. The plaintiffs also asserted establishment clause and
equal protection standing and withdrew a fourth theory, taxpayer standing. Id. at n.1. This
Note focuses only on voter standing, which is the unique aspect of the ARM litigation, and
does not discuss or analyze the other standing strategies used.
114. ARM 1, 544 F. Supp. at 482.
115. Id.
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[was] worth more than one given to non-exempt organizations. '' 16
The district court found this injury sufficient to meet the first consti-
tutional requirement. Relying on Baker v. Carr,"7 the court found that
"[b]oth cases [ARM I and Baker] center on allegations that some arbi-
trary government action diluted the strength of voters in one group at the
expense of those in another.""' Although the plaintiffs' injury was based
on issues, rather than on geography as expressed in Baker, the district
court observed, "The bottom line is that plaintiffs have alleged govern-
ment action which has improperly biased the political process against the
discrete group to which they belong.""' 9 The defendants argued that
Baker required "a showing of mathematical dilution of voting strength as
a prerequisite of voter standing[,]"' 120 but the court ruled that the "preci-
sion with which an injury can be defined is irrelevant to the concreteness
of the injury .... 12
b. Causation/Redressability
In analyzing the second constitutional requirement, causa-
tion/redressability, the district court noted that the plaintiffs were not
"objecting to the [Catholic] church's political activity per se and [were
not] seeking relief in the form of a legislatively guaranteed right to abor-
tion" but instead "asserted a more circumscribed grievance and
request."1 22
The court found that the plaintiffs had met the causation element by
showing that "the government defendants' tax policy is the source of the
distortion in the political process that plaintiffs complain of.' 23 The
plaintiffs also met the redressability element since "[a]n injunction
against that discriminatory policy [would] restore the proper balance be-
tween adversaries in the abortion debate [,]124 because each would re-
ceive equal tax treatment.
2. Prudential Limitations
After finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the constitutional re-
quirements for voter standing, the court next evaluated whether the
plaintiffs had met the prudential factors.12 5 First, the court found that
"[a]lthough a large number of citizens likely share the injuries alleged by
116. Id.
117. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
118. ARM 1, 544 F. Supp. at 481.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 482.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
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the... voters... , these are not 'generalized grievances' such that there
will be any lack of sharp controversy." 126 The court reasoned that the
doctrine of standing should not restrict access "if the court is satisfied
that plaintiffs bring a live and pointed controversy to it"' 27 and stated,
"There is not the slightest reason to believe that the wide dispersion of
plaintffs' injuries will diffuse the contest before the court."' 28 Thus, the
plaintiffs had overcome the first prudential limitation.
Second, the court noted that while the "zone of interest" hurdle was
erected because "of the judiciary's limited competence to resolve societal
.. disputes and [to recognize] the superiority of other mechanisms to
make complex social choices[,] [n]ot all issues of broad public impor-
tance [are] better left to the executive and the legislature."'' 29 In ARM I,
the court found the resolution best left to the judiciary because the plain-
tiffs were seeking "a judicial determination of whether defendants have
observed Congress' commands [regarding established policy under sec-
tion 501(c)(3)]."' ' 30
The court easily overcame the last hurdle, finding that "[t]his law-
suit does not present the potential problem of a disinterested plaintiff
advocating the interests of persons not before the court.' 13 ' Instead the
court found the ARM I plaintiffs well situated to argue the case because
"[t]he action... involve[d] no rights that the rightholder would not wish
to assert or that the plaintiffs [were] likely not to press vigorously."'' 3 2
The court found that twenty individual plaintiffs had voter standing
"to contest the alleged infringement of their right to participate in the
political process on equal terms with all others and free from arbitrary
government interference."' 33 Additionally, three organizations-ARM,
Nassau-NOW, and the Women's Health Network, Inc.-had standing
"to represent their voter-members injured by the challenged government
conduct."1 34
126. ARM I, 544 F. Supp. at 484.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 485.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 491.
134. Id. The court had earlier noted that while organizations cannot attain voter standing
in their own right, they can establish standing through representation of their members. Id. at
480 n.9. The three organizations were allowed voter standing because they "are devoted to
promoting women's rights, including the right to a legal abortion [and] [g]iven the political
orientation of this organizational purpose, these entities have powerful claims to represent
voter-members .... ." Id.
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C. ARM Procedural History and Disposition
In addition to finding that the ARM I plaintiffs had standing, the
district court denied the Government's motion to dismiss. Soon thereaf-
ter, however, the Supreme Court handed down a new decision on section
501(c)(3) status and standing. The Court's ruling in Allen v. Wright135
prompted the Government to return to court to seek a redetermination of
standing in ARM L
L The Allen v. Wright Decision
In Allen, 136 the Supreme Court rejected a third-party challenge of
IRS policies that permitted schools alleged to discriminate on the basis of
race to maintain their tax exemptions. The Court denied standing to the
parents of black children in public school districts undergoing
desegregation. 137
Like ARM I, Allen involved citizens who sought to force the govern-
ment to revoke the section 501(c)(3) status of a nonprofit organization.
The plaintiffs asserted that the IRS was not enforcing a section 501(c)(3)
limitation that applies to tax-exempt schools. This caveat on an institu-
tion's exempt status requires that the school show that it:
[A]dmits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, pro-
grams, and activities generally accorded or made available to stu-
dents at that school and that the school does not discriminate on
the basis of race in administration of its educational policies, ad-
missions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and
other school-administered programs.
The plaintiffs contended that they, representing all similarly situated
blacks, had been denigrated by the IRS's underenforcement of the Code,
or alternatively, that their children had a diminished ability to receive an
education in a racially integrated school. 139 As in ARM I, the plaintiffs
asked for declaratory relief.
The Supreme Court denied standing in Allen on both claims; the
first failed the injury-in-fact requirement. The Court found the claim of
denigration to be not "judicially cognizable,"'"' stating, "This Court has
repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdic-
135. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, quoted in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740
(1984).
139. Allen, 468 U.S. at 746-49. The plaintiffs relied on an earlier case, Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971), summarily affg Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (identi-
cal fact pattern to Allen, yet the Court distinguished Coit from Allen on the ground that Colt
only applied to private schools in the specific region).
140. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754.
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tion on a federal court.' 1 4 1
The Court found that the plaintiffs' second claim failed to satisfy the
causation requirement of Article III standing. Relying on Simon v. East-
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. 142 the Court stated:
The diminished ability of respondents' children to receive a deseg-
regated education would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants
of tax exemptions only if there were enough racially discriminatory
private schools receiving tax exemptions in respondents' communi-
ties for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable
difference in public school integration. 
4 3
As a result, "[t]he links in the chain of causation between the challenged
Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for the
chain as a whole to sustain respondents' standing.'"
Allen reconfirmed the foreclosure of third-party standing in taxation
suits. 145 One commentator made the sweeping statement that "[a]fter
[Allen] it was widely assumed that there were virtually no circumstances
where private citizens could successfully challenge IRS policy unless
their own individual tax liabilities were at stake."'
14 6
2. Voter Standing in ARM After Allen
After its victory in Allen, the Government refiled the ARM case,' 4 7
renewing its motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. The
Government asserted that Allen should prevent plaintiffs' voter standing
in ARM I in light of the Allen Court's interpretation of the causa-
tion/redressability prong of the constitutional analysis of standing.
141. Id.
142. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The Allen Court noted that its earlier decision "held that standing
to challenge a Government grant of a tax exemption to hospitals could not be founded on the
asserted connection between the grant of tax-exempt status and the hospitals' policy concern-
ing the provision of medical services to indigents." Allen, 468 U.S. at 759 (1984); see supra
notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
143. Allen, 468 U.S. at 758.
144. Id. at 759 (the Court did not address either the third prong of the doctrine of stand-
ing, redressability, or the prudential limitations after it found that plaintiffs failed the first two
prongs of the Doctrine); but see Stephan, supra note 31, at 88 ("At first blush, Allen, like
Eastern Kentucky, before it, seems to forbid all forms of enforcement standing. But by relegat-
ing the issue to an ad hoc and malleable causation inquiry, while not addressing the more
definitive zone-of-interests test, Allen may contain the seeds of a future expansion of enforce-
ment standing.
These openings permit other courts and Congress to consider whether to cabin judicial
review of tax disputes within the present limits, or to broaden the opportunities for
nontaxpayers to challenge the government's interpretation of the law.").
145. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text; see generally Stephan, supra note 31, at
80-88 (before Allen, the Court had given plenary consideration to only one tax enforcement
case, Eastern Kentucky in which the Court suggested an unwillingness, if not a flat refusal, to
recognize such suits.).
146. Schwarz, supra note 84, at 326.
147. ARM II, 603 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Despite the holding in Allen, the court upheld the ARM I court's
decision that the plaintiffs had standing. Judge Carter "refused to bar the
door in a potentially explosive area,"' 48 and distinguished Allen on its
facts, noting that "the Court did not close the door on private suits chal-
lenging government grants of tax exemption ... but used traditional
analysis in concluding that the Allen plaintiffs lacked standing."149
The district court then followed the traditional standing analysis to
review ARM I in light of Allen. In each element of its analysis, the court
distinguished the plaintiff's voter standing theory. On injury in fact, the
court noted that "it has consistently been held that voters have standing
to contest the alleged infringement of their right to participate in the
political process on equal terms with all others free from arbitrary gov-
ernment interference." 15 The court then collapsed the injury-in-fact re-
quirement with the causation/redressability requirement. First, it
reiterated that the plaintiffs' injury was "the alleged arbitrary inequality
of the plaintiffs in the political process vis-a-vis the Catholic Church cre-
ated by the IRS's grant of tax exemption to the latter."' 5 ' Then, the
court noted that "[t]he judicially cognizable injury in Allen was segre-
gated schooling which was neither created nor remediable by IRS action
alone."' 52 The court distinguished the injury in ARM I from Allen be-
cause"[t]he injury alleged in ARM [was on] unequal footing in the polit-
ical arena, a condition completely traceable and within the control of the
IRS.,,1 53
The court also held that the plaintiffs had "surmounted the three
prudential limitations that can defeat standing even when the Article III
case or controversy standards are met."' 54 First, the ARM III plaintiffs'
injuries were not generalized grievances:
[P]laintiffs, despite articulated desires to be politically active on be-
half of their pro-choice views, can not do so without risking their
valuable [section] 501(c)(3) status. This personal denial of equal
treatment is precisely the type of standing required by Allen since
parent plaintiffs in that case "were not personally denied equal
treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct."' 55
Second, "[tihe question of whether plaintiffs are addressing other
parties' rights was answered squarely in the negative by ARM,"' 56 since
the court had found the ARM I plaintiffs well situated to argue the
148. Schwarz, supra note 84, at 326.
149. ARM III, 603 F. Supp. at 971.
150. Id. at 973 (citing ARM , 544 F. Supp. at 480-81 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962))).
151. Id. at 973-74.
152. Id. at 974.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).
156. Id.
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case.Y17 Therefore, the court did not reconsider the question.
Finally, the court reiterated its finding that a voter standing suit
such as ARM I fell within the "zone of interest" Congress established for
section 501(c)(3):
Although the complaint implicates social policy issues, it does not
call for judicial selection of an appropriate policy. Congress has
already made that choice and set out the correct policy in [section]
501(c)(3); plaintiffs ask only for a judicial determination of
whether defendants have observed Congress' commands concern-
ing taxes and engaging in political activity. The prudential barriers
do not restrict a court from adjudicating a claim merely because of
the interplay between the litigation and social controversy. 5 '
The court upheld voter standing and denied the Government's motion to
dismiss.
3. Subsequent Judicial Review
Although the IRS did not directly seek review of the district court's
ruling on the plaintiff's standing, the issue was raised as a basis for chal-
lenging a separate court order. The district court held the churchorgani-
zations (USCC and NCCB), dismissed as defendants in ARM I, in
contempt for refusing to comply with the plaintiffs' requests for,discov-
ery.159 The USCC and NCCB challenged the contempt order on the
ground that because the ARM plaintiffs lacked standing, 60 te .district
court lacked fundamental subject matter jurisdiction to issue the
order. 161
The court of appeals then had to decide whether the USCC and
NCCB had standing to challenge the plaintiffs' standing. The court
found that a witness party (such as the church organizations) could chal-
lenge a contempt order only to the extent that it asserted no "colorable
jurisdiction [in the district court] over the underlying lawsuit."'. 2 The
court also held that a mere challenge to the plaintiffs' right to sue would
be an insufficient ground upon which to base the alleged lack of jurisdic-
tion below. 163
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding by summa-
rizing the case:
157. Id.
158. Id. at 975 (citing ARM 1, 544 F. Supp. 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
159. ARM V, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1987) (The dismissed church defendants, appealed
when they were held in contempt of court for refusing to comply with third party subpoenas
during discovery of the ongoing litigation and were fined $50,000 per day for each day of
further noncompliance).
160. ARM V, 824 F.2d at 160.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 165.
163. See Id.
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Plaintiffs' suit is more than a citizen effort to have the tax laws
enforced and more than a taxpayer effort to complain of tax ex-
emptions of others that might violate the Establishment Clause.
The plaintiffs have claimed direct, personal injury arising from the
fact that the federal defendants' failure to enforce the political ac-
tion limitations of section 501(c)(3) has placed the plaintiffs at a
competitive disadvantage with the Catholic Church in the arena of
public advocacy on important public issues. That is a substantial
basis on which to predicate standing. We need determine no more
than that to conclude that the District Court had at least a colora-
ble basis for the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs' suit.16
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve whether a non-
party witness may defend against a civil contempt adjudication by chal-
lenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court."' 165
The Supreme Court heard the procedural issue along with the un-
derlying issue of whether the ARM I plaintiffs had standing to sue the
IRS to compel it to revoke the tax-exempt status of the Church. 6 6 The
nonparty church defendants (USCC and NCCB), supported by the gov-
ernment defendants, reiterated their argument that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the ARM plaintiffs lacked
standing.'67 During the oral arguments, the plaintiffs focused on the pro-
cedural issue being appealed and only briefly touched the standing
issue.168
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision, ruling
that a nonparty found to be in contempt can challenge the contempt or-
der by asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the court that
issued it.169 The Court declined to address the underlying standing issue
and remanded the case to the court of appeals to "determine whether the
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction in the underlying ac-
tion." 70 The Court gave no new guidelines regarding the assessment of
voter standing in this context.
164. Id. at 165-66 (footnote omitted).
165. ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268, 2269 (1988).
166. See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 1, ARM V1, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (No. 87-
416); Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 1, ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (No. 87-416); see
also Payne, supra note 10, at 436.
167. See ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. at 2269; Payne, supra note 10, at 436.
168. Payne, supra 10, at 437. Payne observed that "most of the Court... seemed skeptical
of the church's sweeping jurisdictional claims," and predicted that the Court "may be willing
to put the standing problem aside for now and uphold the principle of a single appeal." Id.
169. ARM V1, 108 S. Ct. at 2270.
170. Id. at 2273.
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IV. Analysis
If the ARM case again reaches the Supreme Court, and if the Court
considers the question of voter standing in third-party challenges of non-
profit tax exemption, the Court likely will reverse the lower court's find-
ing of standing. The district court's determination of voter standing can
be interpreted quite differently when reexamined in light of the legislative
intent of tax exemption, the stance of the Supreme Court on standing in
third-party tax suits, and the current trend of the Court toward interpret-
ing standing as a separation of powers issue.
A. Tax exemption
Significantly, the Court has not yet granted standing to any third
party challenging the tax-exempt status of a charitable organization. 1
7 1
The notable reluctance of the Supreme Court to allow standing in such
cases has been much analyzed and criticized, yE but is well founded on
strong policy supporting charitable organizations.
173
Additionally, the Court should not attempt to override clear legisla-
tive policy. The legislature supports the public purposes nonprofit orga-
nizations serve by providing subsidies through tax exemptions under the
Internal Revenue Code. In the face of first amendment attacks on the
section 501(c)(3) lobbying limitations, the Supreme Court not only up-
held the provisions as constitutional,7 * but also recognized the tax-ex-
empt provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as an important method of
subsidy to nonprofit organizations.
7 5
B. Constitutional Standing
The district court found voter standing, both before and after Al-
len, 7 6 and the court of appeals did not reverse that finding,17 7 which
171. Recently, the Supreme Court has decided only two cases other than the ARM cases
involving third-party enforcement of IRS activities: Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) and
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); the Court denied stand-
ing in both.
172. See Asimow, Standing to Challenge Lenient Tax Rules: A Statutory Solution, 57
TAXES 483 (1979); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 69 (1977); Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 40-42 (1984); Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1526-30 (1984); Lynch,
Nontaxpayer Suits: Seeking Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Against IRS Administrative Ac-
tion, 12 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1978); McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges
of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (1984);
Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985);
Stephan, supra note 31; Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-
Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979).
173. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
175. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544-45 (1983).
176. 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see supra notes 111-158 and accompanying text.
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prompts another look at the district court's original standing analysis.
1. Constitutional Requirements
The district court's determination of the first element of Article III
standing, injury in fact, merits another look. The court found that the
ARM plaintiffs suffered injury as voters because of unequal treatment:
the IRS allows the Catholic Church to receive tax-deductible donations
that it can funnel toward lobbying anti-abortion politicians and legisla-
tion, while it denies tax-exempt status to the ARM groups as long as they
receive tax-deductible funds.178
Both the plaintiffs and the district court relied on Baker v. Carr,179
yet the cases are distinguishable. Baker involved plaintiffs who were vot-
ers residing in a county with a "gross disproportion of representation to
voting population."' 0 Their injury was their inequitable voting power
vis-A-vis voters in other counties. 8 ' The ARM plaintiffs claimed voter
standing, yet the injury they described did not involve a dilution of their
voting power, but rather an inequality in their ability to receive tax-de-
ductible donations.1 82 The ARM plaintiffs also claimed that this subsidi-
zation of the Catholic Church's political activities had "distorted the
electoral and legislative process .. 8., 3 yet no connection is made to
discern harm to the plaintiffs as voters.' 4
Thus presented, the plaintiffs' injury seems less specific and more
generalized. The Supreme Court disallowed the generalized injury
presented in Allen v. Wright..5 and stated, "Recognition of standing in
such circumstances would transform the federal courts into 'no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned by-
standers.' "186 In response to Allen, the district court upheld the injury-
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
179. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
180. Id. at 207.
181. Id.
182. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the Federal Respon-
dents at 10, ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (No. 87-416).
,183. ARMI, 544 F. Supp. 472,482 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see supra note 114 and accompanying
text; see also Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 52, ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (No. 87-
416).
184. See also Brief for the Federal Respondents at 10, ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988)
(No. 87-416) ("This assertion does not constitute the type of direct personal injury that can
support Article III standing.").
185. 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see supra notes 136-146 and accompanying text.
186. Id. at 756 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). The Court could also apply the unusually strict
reasoning it used in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and disallow voter
standing on the basis that the voters must actually prove that they will not suffer inequities if
the IRS revokes the exemption status of the challenged organization. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
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in-fact finding for voter standing, but continued to characterize it as "un-
equal footing in the political arena,"18 7 with little explanation as to how
the plaintiffs' voting power was thereby injured, except for a broad state-
ment concerning voter standing in general.1 88
Even if the plaintiffs' injury is not a generalized harm, the causa-
tion/redressability requirements are still difficult to overcome. The plain-
tiffs' situation seems similar to that in Eastern Kentucky'89 because
whether a revocation of the tax-exempt status of the Catholic Church
would have any effect on the alleged inequities in the receipt of funds is
"purely speculative."' 90 Moreover, the plaintiffs made no showing that
the remedy would affect their voting power, as opposed to their partici-
pation in political activities.19'
2. Prudential Limitations
The ARM plaintiffs' contention that their tax status puts them on
unequal footing in the political arena constitutes a "generalized grievance
... most appropriately addressed in the representative branches."'' 92 If
accepted, this argument would cause standing to fail under the first pru-
dential restraint. Moreover, although the Court has recognized voter
standing,193 the voter standing alleged in the ARM cases may be deemed
not judicially cognizable as too abstract in light of the sheer numbers of
litigants who could possibly have standing under such a theory.' 94
The zone-of-interests determination also merits review. The
Supreme Court recently stated the test for this restraint as whether the
plaintiff's interests are so closely related to the purposes of the statute to
assume that Congress would permit the suit.' 95 The district court's anal-
ysis seems to construe this test to find that it is within the zone of interest
187. ARM III, 603 F. Supp. 970, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
188. See supra notes 147-158 and accompanying text.
189. 426 U.S. 26 (1976); see supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
190. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 10-11, ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (No. 87-
416).
191. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
192. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
194. Allowing standing in such cases could literally open the floodgates of litigation. See
infra note 214. See also Evans, supra note 2, at 1196 ("The USCC, the NCCB, and the various
religious organizations that joined in filing an amicus curiae brief fear that a ruling upholding
ARM's challenge would, lead to harassment of religious organizations and other exempt
groups by political opponents through the Federal courts."); Brief for the Federal Respondents
at 15 n.8, ARM VI, 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988) (No. 87-416) ("permitting the present case to
proceed to trial would encourage similar suits by third parties dissatisfied with the tax treat-
ment of other groups with whose views they disagree").
195. Clarke v. See. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987); see supra notes 71-74 and ac-
companying text.
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established for section 501(c)(3) for plaintiffs to urge its enforcement.196
Congress clearly made no provisions for either private enforcement or for
suits by third parties in section 501(c)(3).197
The analysis of the remaining prudential limitation, whether the
plaintiffs are suited to addressing other parties' fights, also needs clarifi-
cation. The statement that "the action . . . involves no fights that the
rightholder would not wish to assert or that the plaintiffs are likely not to
press vigorously"'98 is confusing. To which fights is the court referring:
the "right" to vote, the "right" to participate in the political arena
equally, or the "right" to receive tax-deductible donations? The district
court's evaluation of this limitation is not clear.199
In summary, the finding of voter standing is tenuous and easily
could be struck down under subsequent judicial review.
C. Separation of Powers
The Court's emphasis on separation of powers in disallowing stand-
ing under Allen" specifically addressed causation problems, but applies
to the ARM cases:
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing doctrine
explains why our cases preclude the conclusion that respondents'
alleged injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' of the
IRS.... That conclusion would pave the way generally for suits
challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of
law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out
their legal obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allega-
tions of several instances of violations of law, are rarely if ever ap-
propriate for federal-court adjudication.2°"
Congress provided a declaratory judgment procedure, for review of tax-
exemption status, that is available only to the party whose exempt status
is involved.20 2 This limitation weakens the justiciability of a third-party
challenge in a judicial climate emphasizing separation of powers in stand-
ing analysis. 203
Conclusion
Although the ARM cases apparently demonstrated a new strategy-
voter standing to allow third parties to step into the shoes of the IRS to
196. ARM III, 603 F. Supp. 970, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see supra note 158 and accompany-
ing text.
197. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
198. ARM I, 544 F. Supp. 471, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
199. Id.
200. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
201. Id. at 759-60 (citation omitted).
202. See supra note 20.
203. See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
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challenge the tax-exempt status of nonprofit organizations-the odds are
against its ultimate success.
Congress and the judicial interpretation of its legislation have de-
scribed a strong public policy for the creation and subsidization (through
tax provisions such as section 501(c)(3) 2", which allows a nonprofit,
charitable organization to be exempt from paying federal income tax, and
section 170(c)(2),2 °5 which allows tax-deductible contributions to that or-
ganization) of nonprofit, charitable organizations that are deemed to ful-
fill duties similar to those of government institutions.
Once the IRS has denied an organization's tax-exempt status under
sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c)(2), the organization has redress in adminis-
trative proceedings. °6 Supreme Court review of IRS administrative pro-
ceedings is limited to the parties whose qualifications are at issue.20 7
Congress has not statutorily provided third-party standing in such suits.
Third parties who wish to challenge the IRS determination must
rely on the doctrine of standing to do so. 208 The third-party challenger
must meet three constitutional requirements: injury in fact, causation,
and redressability.2 °9 Once the plaintiffs have met the three constitu-
tional tests, however, the court may nonetheless deny standing under the
judicially-imposed "prudential limitations., 210
The trend of the Supreme Court regarding standing has been toward
greater leniency, with the notable exception of disallowing standing in
cases involving federal income tax.21 1 To date, the Court has never found
standing in cases in which third parties have challenged the IRS tax-
exemption determinations of nonprofit, charitable organizations. 21 2
ARM V1213 provided the Court with its most recent opportunity to refine
its criteria for standing in such cases. The plaintiffs' based their unique
theory of standing on the political inequity created by the failure of the
IRS to enforce section 501(c)(3) lobbying limitations on the Catholic
Church. The Court declined, however, to decide whether this voter-
standing theory could support a plaintiffs suit to force the IRS to review
or revoke the tax-exempt status of another.214
Attorneys for both the Catholic Church and the Government "ar-
gued that allowing such a suit to proceed would open the courts to a rash
204. See supra note 12.
205. See supra note 13.
206. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 20.
208. See supra notes 28-101 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 171.
213. 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988).
214. Id.
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of politically motivated suits by people challenging the tax exemptions of
groups they disagree with." '215 By rendering nonprofit organizations vul-
nerable to such attack, voter standing could have a chilling effect on the
very existence of nonprofit, charitable organizations. 216
Taken together, the strong public policy in support of charitable or-
ganizations, the lack of legislative provisions for third-party standing to
challenge the tax-exempt status of organizations, the restrictive IRS ad-
ministrative procedures for tax-exempt organizations, the trend of the
Court to disallow third-party standing in challenges of exemption, and
the Court's emphasis on the separation-of-powers doctrine, present a for-
midable obstacle to third-party suits challenging tax-exempt status.
Voter standing, as presented in the ARM cases, seems too weak to ac-
complish the task.
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